European Unemployment. A Tale of Demand and Supply by Paul De Grauwe
1
1. Diagnostics of the European unemployment: the contrast with the US
Much has been said about the differences in the functioning of the labour markets in
Europe and the US. These differences are well summarised in the following graph
(see fig 1). First, during recessions American unemployment quite often increases
substantially, even more so than European unemployment. This is the case, for
example, during the recessions of 1974-76 and 1980-82. It is less so during the
recession of 1991-93
1. However, during the upturn of economic activity, the
American unemployment always declines to its pre-recession level. As a result, the
long term trend in the American unemployment rate is flat. In contrast, although the
European unemployment rate typically increases less than the American one during
the recession, it never declines to its pre-recession level. As a result, the long term
trend is upwards. This ratchet effect is quite worrisome. It appears that each time
Europe is hit by a shock (say, a recession) unemployment goes up, while when the
economy improves unemployment stays put or goes down only partially. Thus,
temporary disturbances like recessions have permanent effects on European
unemployment. This feature is totally absent from the US data.
The ratchet effect in the European unemployment is particularly striking during the
1990s. We see that European unemployment increased by close to 40% during the
decade.  This increase occurred essentially during two years, i.e. from 1991 to 1993
when unemployment went  from 8% to 11%. After that, it pretty much remained
unchanged despite a recovery of economic activity.
How can we explain this troublesome European phenomenon whereby each shock
seems to bring the unemployment rate to a higher level? In what follows we will
concentrate our attention on what happened during the 1990s. The analysis can,
however, easily be extended to the previous episodes of rising European
unemployment.
One story about the increase in unemployment in the European Union during the
1990s is that it is wholly due to labour market rigidities and the high taxation of
labour. In this view, the European unemployment is a supply side (micro-economic)
problem disconnected from the demand side and, in particular, from the process of2
dis-inflation that was pursued during the decade in order to comply to the Maastricht
convergence criteria. This is now the consensus view of the European monetary policy
makers. The latter consider the unemployment problem to be totally outside the realm
of their responsibility.
Figure 1:



















































































Source: European Commission, European Economy
This story, however, is quite unsatisfactory. It fails to explain the exact dynamics of
the increase in unemployment in the European Union. As mentioned earlier (see
figure 1), the increase in unemployment was very much concentrated in just a few
years. It is difficult to see how labour market rigidities and taxation of labour, which
have not changed much during the period, can be held responsible for the sudden
surge of unemployment during the early 1990s.
A more satisfactory hypothesis is one that takes into account both demand and supply
side phenomena (micro and macro-economic phenomena). We first formulate the
hypothesis in very general terms. In the next sections we discuss it in more detail. The
                                                                                                                                           
1 Note that we have indicated the period of recessions by vertical shaded areas. We have also3
hypothesis can be formulated as follows. The recession of the early 1990s was mainly
due to a decline in aggregate demand. This led to an increase in unemployment in all
industrial countries. The difference between the EU and the Anglo-Saxon countries is
that the lack of labour market flexibility in the former countries prevented the rate of
unemployment from declining subsequently. Put differently, the labour market
rigidities in the EU transform temporary cyclical disturbances into permanent
increases in unemployment. This feature is mostly absent from the movements in the
unemployment rate in the United States.
2. Demand policies during the 1990s.
In this section we study the nature of the monetary and fiscal policies in the EU-11
and compare it with the US policy mix during the 1990s. (We have chosen the EU-11,
i.e. the group of EU countries that is likely to start EMU on January 1, 1999, because
this group has followed demand policies very much geared towards adhering to the
Maastricht-mandated convergence criteria).
Figure 2 provides some evidence concerning the conduct of monetary policies. We
present and compare the real short-term interest rates in the EU-11 and in the US
during the first half of the 1990s. It is now generally accepted that the short-term real
interest rate is the best indicator of the stance of monetary policies. We observe a great
contrast between the US and the EU-11’s conduct of monetary policies. During the
US recession which occurred in 1990-91, the US monetary authorities were willing to
let the short term real interest rate drop to 1 to 2%. In contrast, in the EU-11 the
monetary authorities maintained real interest rates well above 5% throughout the
recession.
This policy of keeping historically high short term real interest rates during a recession
was very much influenced by the German position in the EMS. During the early
1990s, the German monetary authorities fought a battle against “excessive” inflation
(4% a year), while most of the other EMS-countries decided to continue to peg to the
strong DM and were thereby dragged by Germany into applying a policy of strong
monetary restriction in the midst of their most serious post-war recession.
                                                                                                                                           
taken the EU recessions as the reference.4
Whatever the institutional reasons, one can conclude that the EU-11 followed
significantly more restrictive monetary policies than the US during the first half of the
1990s. What about fiscal policies?
Figure 3 shows the structural budget deficits as measured by the OECD for the EU-11
and for the US. This is the deficit corrected for business cycle influences, and
therefore measures the effect of discretionary policies on the government budgets. It
can be considered as a good indicator of the nature of the budgetary policies. When
the lines in figure 4 increase, one can say that the authorities followed restrictive fiscal
policies (by raising taxes or reducing spending).
Figure 2:






















































































































Source: European Commission, European Economy5
From figure 3 one observes that the EU-11 countries started to apply policies of fiscal
restriction from 1991 on. They continued to do so throughout the 1990s and
accelerated their efforts in 1996-97 at the approach of the Maastricht deadline. The
US applied similar restrictive fiscal policies throughout the 1990s, despite the absence
of an explicit institutional framework a la Maastricht.
Figure 3:






















Source: OECD, Economic Outlook
Comparing the monetary and fiscal policies of the EU-11 and the US during the first
half of the 1990s, we conclude that the EU-11 policy mix can be characterised by
monetary and fiscal restriction. The US on the other hand, followed quite a different
policy mix. It combined fiscal restriction with monetary ease. Thus, the difference
between the EU-11 and the US was monetary policy. Both followed similarly
restrictive fiscal policies. Their monetary policies, however, were very different, with
the EU-11 applying monetary tightness and the US monetary ease during the first half
of the 1990s. All this helps to explain why European economic growth during the
1990s dropped to about half its level of the 1980s. No such growth deceleration was
observed in the US. We conclude that the European demand policies pursued during
the first half of the 1990s are responsible for a significant decline in output and are6
therefore also partially responsible for the increase in unemployment which was very
much concentrated during the period of restrictive demand policies. (In De
Grauwe(1997) more econometric evidence is provided to substantiate this
conclusion). In this sense it can be said that the deflationary demand policies produced
a significant number of the European unemployed. The labour market rigidities then
did the rest and condemned a large part of them to remain unemployed. We analyse
these labour market rigidities in more detail in the next section.
3. European unemployment and the supply side
Demand side shocks alone cannot explain the persistent and increasing unemployment
in Europe. We need the supply side too, and more in particular the rigidities in the
labour market to understand the nature of the problem. The rigidities that matter have
recently been studied in detail by Steve Nickel(1997). They are the unemployment
benefit schemes, the centralised wage bargaining systems, minimum wages coupled
with the high level of taxation on labour
2. It is important to realise that these rigidities
perform a social function. Most of them explicitly or implicitly aim at providing
protection of the income of those who have a job
3. Let us analyse some of these.
·  Minimum wages protect the worker (the insider) against the unemployed (the
outsider) who would undercut the wage of the worker. At the same time minimum
wages protect the profits of the firm against the low wage competition of other
firms. It is clear that opening up markets towards trade from low wage countries
makes this kind of protection less effective.
·  Unemployment benefits, of course, protect workers from too large an income loss
when they become unemployed. At the same time, however, generous
unemployment benefits also protect the income of the insiders against competition
by the outsiders. The reason is that generous unemployment benefits lead the
                                                
2  See also the recent study of Daveri and Tabellini(1997) on the importance of taxation of
labour.
3 Some labour market rigidities also arise because of measures to protect the employment of
workers. The most important one here is the job protection legislation (e.g. restrictions on
firing workers, high redundancy payments). According to the previously cited work of Steve
Nickel these protective measures do not seem to affect unemployment very much, contrary to
income protection measures.7
unemployed to reduce their efforts at finding a job. As a result, the supply of labour
is reduced. This has the effect of reducing the downward pressure on wages that
normally would accompany an increase in unemployment.
·  Centralised wage bargaining, by fixing the wage structure for all workers in an
industry (or even country), also reduces competition in the labour market and
protects the income of those who have a job.
In combination with the high taxation of labour these income protection schemes
make the European labour markets very vulnerable to shocks (e.g. a recession). We
illustrate this by a stylised example of the combination of unemployment benefits and
the taxation of labour. This will allow us to construct a curve that summarises the
essence of the supply side problems in Europe.
We start from the well-known phenomenon of the tax wedge, i.e. the difference
between the gross and net wages which increase with the level of income. We
illustrate the phenomenon in figure 4. It represents the situation of a hypothetical
European economy where the gross wage cost of the firm quickly moves to twice the
net wage for the worker. We will also assume that income and skill levels are
perfectly correlated.
Figure 4:












Let us now introduce unemployment benefits (which we arbitrarily set at 150 for
everybody who is unemployed). We subtract this number from the net wage of the
worker. What we now obtain we call the net earnings from working. That is, it
represents the extra remuneration the worker obtains for his work effort above what he
would get if he did not work. We show these numbers in figure 5:
Figure 5:
























We observe the well-known phenomenon that the remuneration for work effort is
extremely low for low-skilled workers. This is the result of the combination of
unemployment benefits and high taxation. In figure 5 we have represented the case,
often observed in European countries, that the net remuneration from working is
negative for the lowest skill. This often happens when unemployed obtain additional
benefits, e.g. rent subsidies, free public transportation, etc.
The last step in the analysis consists in constructing a curve which is the net earnings
from working as a percent of gross wage cost. We show this curve in figure 6. It has a
strongly non-linear shape. Take the first skill level for which this percentage is
positive (when the number is negative rational workers will simply not take a job).
This is skill level 1 with a percentage of 15%. This means that when the firm pays 100
to this worker, the latter’s net earnings from his work is only 15. The latter number
can be interpreted as the remuneration society gives to this worker for his decision to9
work. The firm, however pays 100 to this same worker. Profit maximising firms will
make sure that the productivity of this worker is at least 100. Otherwise the worker
will simply not keep his job. Thus, the firm expects an effort form the worker worth at
least 100. The worker receives for this effort only 15. There is thus a huge distortion
between the value that the firms wants to extract from the worker and the effort
(measured in money terms) that the worker will be willing to spend on the job. We
can also call this distortion the difference in valuation of the same work by the firm
and the worker. In this example, the worker values the job he is performing as a very
small fraction of the value (the cost) the firm attaches to this work. This distortion in
the valuation of the same work by workers and firms is at the core of the European
unemployment problem. In figure 6 we present this distortion graphically as a function
of the income level of the worker.
Figure  6 shows that the distortion is the highest for low income (low skill) workers.
As the income level increases the net earnings workers obtain from their decision to
work increases relative to the wage cost for the firm. As a result, the distance between
the value attached by the firm to the workers effort and the value the worker attaches
to his effort narrows. The distortion declines. There is a point where the distortion
increases again due to the influence of the progressivity of taxation that is present in a
typical European economy.
Figure 6:
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What is the effect of this difference in valuation of the same work by the firm and the
worker? Clearly, the low skilled worker has a very small incentive to supply his
services in the (official) labour market. In many European countries the net earnings
from work for the lowest skill worker are close to zero, so that this work tends to
disappear, and to show up in the unemployment statistics
4. There is thus no mystery in
the fact that a very large fraction of European unemployed are unskilled. In this
connection, much has been said about the bias in technological change against the low
skilled workers. Empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis has not been strong
(see S. Nickell(1997)). A much more satisfactory explanation is the one provided
here: the income protection system together with taxation has created a strong bias
against the low-skilled labour.
We can now make the link with the analysis of the demand side of the previous
section to explain the European phenomenon of permanent increases in
unemployment with each business cycle shock. Suppose that a downturn in economic
activity reduces employment uniformly for all skill levels. The workers who loose
their job, had accumulated skills while working. Part of these skills is now lost. As a
result, each new unemployed moves down in the skill ladder. Let us assume that each
of them moves down one step in terms of our figure 6. For most of the high- and
medium skilled workers this does not change the incentive to look for a new job. At
the low end, however, the downward movement radically changes these incentives.
The less skilled they are, the stronger the “downward slide” into the unemployment
trap that the protective system has created. They become permanently unemployed.
When the economic activity picks up again, they cannot “climb up the curve” again
5.
Note that we can phrase this effect also from the point of view of the firm. We can ask
the question what the gross wage is the firm would have to pay in order to ensure that
the worker has a financial incentive to how supply his services. In order to answer that
question let us assume that the median income worker has sufficiently strong
incentives to supply his labour services. In figure 6 this is the worker in the income
category labelled 9. We then compute the gross wage cost needed to match the supply
                                                
4 It also, and quite inevitably, leads to a thriving “underground economy” for unskilled
labour.
5 Note that this analysis also explains why unskilled newcomers in the labour market will find
it very difficult to climb the ladder and to escape from the unemployment trap.11
incentives of the median worker. The result is given in figure 7. We observe that this
hypothetical gross wage cost is approximately 70% above the gross wage cost the firm
pays out. (Note that figure 7 we assume the same tax rates and unemployment benefits
as in figure 6). This gap between the hypothetical and the actual wage cost declines
sharply with the skill level.
If we assume that the actual wage cost paid out by the firm reflects the productivity of
the worker, we can interpret figure 7 as follows
6. For low levels of skill, the firm has
to bear a wage cost which is significantly above labour productivity in order to make
these low-skill jobs attractive to the worker. As figure 7 suggests, for low skill
workers this extra wage cost above productivity reaches 60 to 70%. A firm that would
want to attract a worker who has lost his job would have to pay a wage exceeding the
(reduced) productivity of the worker so as to give him a net wage that is high enough
to give him the incentive to take on this new job. Most firms will not want to do this.
Thus, the worker may perceive the problem in a very different way. He observes that
no firm is willing to provide him with a job that will give him a net income worth
doing the extra effort. Note that in this interpretation, the unemployment benefits
together with the high taxation work in the same way as minimum wages. Thus, even
if there are no explicit minimum wages, the combination of generous unemployment
benefits and labour taxes create de facto minimum wages
7.
Figure 7:
                                                
6  This is not an unreasonable assumption to make. After all, profit maximising firms will try
to match the wage cost to the productivity of the last worker employed.
7 This phenomenon may also explain why the econometric evidence between explicit
minimum wages and unemployment is so weak. We often find that countries with low or non-



























Several aspects should be noted about the mechanism described in the previous
sections. First, as the low skilled withdraw from the labour market, their withdrawal
eliminates a potential labour market equilibrating mechanism, i.e. a downward
movement on the wage level. Thus, we will observe considerable wage rigidity
despite large scale unemployment
8. The existence of considerable wage rigidity in
Europe as opposed to the US has been well documented.
Second, econometric studies looking at the correlation between unemployment and
protective measures (such as unemployment benefits or minimum wages), have often
failed to discover much relation. This has to do with the fact that these measures are in
place for a long time. As long as no shock occur, they do not affect unemployment
much. When shocks occur, these measures start to “bite”.
We conclude that the existence of the distortion that we illustrated in figure 4 makes it
all but inevitable that in a labour market based on free contracts low skilled labour
will tend to disappear over time. The only way the employment of unskilled labour
can be made profitable again is by removing the distortion. If this is not possible, the
government will have to take over that segment of the labour market. This is what is
happening in Europe today. We come back to this issue in a later section.
                                                
8 This has also been stressed in the insider-outsider models proposed by Lindbeck and
Snower(1988). See also Blanchard and Summers(1986).13
4. How to devise the right policies?
The European unemployment problem can also be described as follows. Negative
shocks lead workers (especially low-skilled workers) to fall into the unemployment
trap. In order to get out of this trap they should be pulled and pushed out of it. The
pulling must come from macro-economic policies that are sufficiently conducive to
economic growth. We have argued that they were not sufficiently so during the 1990s.
In the next section we analyse the prospects for more stimulatory demand policies in
the future EMU. Pulling alone will however not help, if the unemployed are not
pushed out of the trap. Here labour market reform together with a reduction of the
taxation on labour are the appropriate responses. They will give incentives to workers
to want to be employed and to firms to want to hire the unemployed. All this is well-
known. There are, however, great obstacles to implement such policies which we
discuss in section 6.
5. The risk of deflationary demand policies in the future EMU
Is there a risk that the authorities of the future euro-area will repeat the policy errors of
the 1990s and pursue too deflationary macro-economic policies in the euro-area? This
is the question we analyse in this section. We first analyse monetary policies and then
fiscal policies in the future EMU.
5. 1 The risk of monetary deflation in the future EMU
One of the challenges confronting the ECB is to establish a reputation of an institution
capable of producing low inflation. This challenge looms large over the future
operations of the ECB. There is now a universal recognition in the financial markets
that the establishment of such a strong reputation is the foremost priority of the future
ECB. But how low will inflation have to be to give the ECB the reputation it seeks?
One benchmark is probably going to be the inflation rate that the present EU-countries
likely to enter EMU in 1999, have achieved. Anything higher than this benchmark
may be interpreted by the market as insufficient to acquire a low inflation reputation.14
In table 1 we show the rates of inflation achieved in these EU-countries. We observe
the remarkable phenomenon that the EU-11 have now been able to reduce their
inflation rates to less than 2% on average.
Should we rejoice about these successes in lowering inflation in the EU-11? The
answer is not so sure. Two issues arise here. First, there is the issue of what the
inflation objective should be. Second, there is the question of the trade-off between
inflation and output stabilisation.
What should be the inflation target of the European monetary authorities? In the
economic literature two arguments have been developed recently suggesting that an
inflation target of less than 2% is probably too low. First, there is a measurement
problem. As was stressed by the Boskin report, our conventional measures of inflation
do not sufficiently take into account quality improvements
9. This leads to an upward
bias estimated to be 1.1% on average in the US. Second, the existence of money
illusion leads to a situation in which real wage flexibility is enhanced when there is
some inflation. In a dynamic world some sectors need to reduce real wages, others to
increase them. When inflation is zero, real wage reduction can only occur through
nominal wage declines. This is made difficult in the presence of money illusion.
Recently Akerlof et al.(1996) has estimated that an inflation rate of 1 to 2% will take
care of the required inter-sectoral real wage adjustments.
Table 1:
Harmonised rates of inflation EU-11










                                                
9 See Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index(1996). See also
Gordon(1996) and Shapiro and Wilcox(1996).15
Portugal 2,3%
Spain 2,4%
   Average EU-11 1,7%
Source: European Commission, Eurostat
All this (quality bias + real wage adjustments) suggests that the inflation target the
authorities should pursue is of the order of 2 to 3% a year. Seen from this perspective,
the inflation rate achieved in the EU-11 in 1997 seems to be too low. If this inflation
rate will be used as a benchmark to judge the performance of the future ECB, there is
a good chance that the ECB will target too low an inflation rate for some time.
The second issue that arises is the trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation.
The Maastricht Treaty states that the primary objective of the ECB is to ensure price
stability. The Treaty, however, also stipulates that the ECB should support the general
economic objectives of the Community, provided these objectives do not endanger
price stability. One of these objectives is the maintenance of high employment. The
Treaty, thus recognises a clear hierarchy in the objectives to be pursued by the ECB,
in which price stability overrides the other economic objectives. Nevertheless, the
Treaty does recognise the responsibility of the ECB as far as employment is
concerned.
How the future ECB will be filling out this mandate is difficult to predict. Today the
general “discours” of European central bankers is that the high European
unemployment has nothing to do with monetary policies, and that it has everything to
do with supply side problems and labour market rigidities. Our analysis of the
deflationary process of the 1990s suggests that this view is wrong. We argued that the
excessive monetary deflation during 1992-93 contributed to the large increase in
unemployment during these two years. An increase that subsequently attained a
permanent character mainly because of the rigidities in the European labour markets.
Thus, the right view about the responsibilities of the European monetary authorities is
that they should try to mitigate recessions so as to avoid excessive increases in
unemployment, which subsequently have a tendency of becoming permanent. The
right view, therefore, recognises that the European unemployment problem is the
result of demand and supply, and therefore requires action both on the demand and the16
supply side. The European monetary authorities cannot just pull out of the game and
leave it to other levels of government to tackle the unemployment problem, as they
have done during the 1990s.
5.2 The deflationary effects of the stability pact
At first sight, things look much brighter on the fiscal front. After many years of fiscal
restrictions, the EU-11 countries have successfully reduced their government budget
deficits to the required 3%. It appears now in 1997 that they will be reaping the
benefits of their budgetary orthodoxy, so that they will be able to relax the budgetary
tightness. In addition, the European business cycle is improving, reducing even further
the need to continue applying budgetary restriction. The stability pact may, however,
interfere in this optimistic prospect.
The need for a stability pact had been hotly debated by economists. One of the main
points of criticism levied against this pact is that it will rob the government budget of
its automatic stabilisers, thereby aggravating recessions. Against this criticism,
officials have replied first that when the recession is severe enough (more than 2%
decline of GDP) the sanctions do not apply, and second, that once the steady state of a
balanced budget is reached, the 3% ceiling on the budget deficit should provide ample
leeway for the deficit to increase during a recession (see European
Commission(1997), and Buti, et al,(1997)). This is undoubtedly so. One problem,
however, is that during the transition towards the steady state, new recessions are
likely to arise, robbing the budgets of part of their automatic stabilisers.
A more fundamental criticism against the stability pact is the following. Whereas the
Maastricht Treaty had set as a norm that the government debt ratio should converge to
60%, the stability pact has fundamentally changed this norm. Instead of 60%, the new
norm for the debt to GDP ratio under the stability pact is 0%. This can be explained as
follows. According to the stability pact, countries have to avoid exceeding the limit of
3% for the budget deficit. In addition, the stability pact stipulates, quite sensibly, that
this necessitates setting medium term budgetary targets which are “close-to-balance or
in surplus”, given that in a recession deficits increase automatically by several17
percentage points
10. This new objective of budget balance, if taken seriously, implies
that governments should stop borrowing. In other words, the government debt should
remain constant. In a growing world, this implies that in the long run the debt/GDP
ratio should converge to zero
11. This requirement is quite a significant change relative
to the Maastricht norm of 60% for the debt to GDP ratio
12. It has important
implications, which we analyse now.
As long as the norm was the Maastricht 60% debt/GDP ratio, countries that came
close to it had the prospect of being able to significantly relax their budgetary
tightness. For example, if the economy is growing at 5% a year, then the deficit can be
set at 3% and at the same time the debt/GDP can be stabilised at the required level of
60%
13. Most countries with a high debt level had the prospect that, as they approached
the 60% norm, they would be able to increase the deficit again without endangering
this norm. True, until the magic 60% was reached, these countries would have to
maintain their budget deficits below 3% so as to reach the target. But once they had
reached it, they would be able to return to the 3% budget deficit, thereby creating a
                                                
10  According to a recent study of the European Commission, budget deficits in the EU-
countries have increased on average by 3.6% of GDP during recessions over the period 1961-
96. See European Commission(1997).
11 The rate of change of the debt to GDP ratio can be written as:
.
bt = dt - gbt (1)
where bt is the debt to GDP ratio in period t, dt is the deficit as a percent of GDP in period t,
and g is the nominal growth rate (assumed to be constant). The stability pact now sets a new
objective for  countries, i.e. that they aim for a balanced budget. This means that dt=0 in (1).
As a result we obtain
.
bt =  - gbt (2)
The solution of this simple differential equation is
bt = C e
-gt (3)
This shows that the debt to GDP ratio must go to zero as t goes to infinity.
12 One could argue that the difference between the Maastricht budgetary norms and the
stability pact is not as pronounced as represented here. The Maastricht Treaty also stipulates
that countries should avoid “excessive deficits” once they are in EMU. The protocol then
refers to 3% as the limit not to be exceeded. Countries failing to avoid excessive deficits
could be sanctioned. By filling in the detail of these sanctions and the exact conditions under
which they will apply, the stability pact has certainly made these Treaty provisions more
binding. In that sense, the stability pact represents a significant tightening.
13 This can be seen from equation (1) in the previous footnote. If the debt/GDP ratio is
stabilised at the level of 60% we find that
d = 0.6 g
With a nominal growth rate (g) of 5% the Maastricht debt target of 60% allows countries to
set their deficits at 3% on average, and still keep this debt target unchanged.18
budgetary “dividend” that could be used, for example, to face the increasing cost of
financing pensions. The prospect of being able to do this, created an expectation in
many countries with a high debt level that there was light at the end of the tunnel.
The operation of the stability pact changes the nature of this dynamics. Countries will
not be able to relax fiscal policies when they come in the neighbourhood of the 60%
debt norm. They will have to continue their budgetary effort. The light in the tunnel
will be a receding one.
One could argue, of course, that the stability pact will not be applied, so that one
should not worry too much about it. There is indeed a good chance that it will not be
put into practice, when governments realise that a literal application of its precepts
will lead them on a road of continuing deflation. In addition, there is also no serious
scientific argument for applying a pact that, if taken seriously, will force governments
(who invest in infrastructure and other public goods) to reduce their debt ratios to
zero, much in the same way as there is no serious argument to be made for firms who
invest, to reduce their debt ratio to zero.
6. How to devise policies to tackle the labour market rigidities in Europe.
Two approaches have been followed to eliminate the unemployment trap that we
analysed in section 3. A first approach could be called the Anglo-Saxon one, the
second will be called the continental European approach.
6.1 The Anglo-Saxon approach.
This approach consists in reducing the level of income protection. We represent the
effect of such a policy in figure 7. We assume that the unemployment benefits are
reduced by half. The net earnings curve can now shift upwards. Working becomes
more valuable and thus more attractive for all workers. However, the relative
improvement is the greatest for the low skilled workers. If, like in our example, the
unemployment benefits are reduced by half, the net earnings from working for the
lowest skilled worker are tripled. This effect is much smaller in relative terms for
higher income workers. We conclude that the distortion which drives out unskilled
labour from the economy is considerably reduced.19
While making work more valuable for everybody, this change towards the Anglo-
Saxon model reduces the degree of income protection of workers with a job. It is clear
that these workers will resist such a change forcefully. As a result, on the European
continent where the resistance has been the highest, governments have attempted to
eliminate the unemployment trap by other means, i.e. without affecting the degree of
income protection of workers.
Figure 7:












5.2 The continental approach
The country that stands out for attempting this approach is France. Instead of reducing
the unemployment benefits, it has introduced schemes aimed at subsidising low skill
workers, in two ways. One is by direct subsidies. The other is by reducing the tax
burden on low-skill workers. The government budget constraint being very tight as a
result of the Maastricht budgetary criteria, the government has compensated these
direct and indirect subsidies by raising taxes on higher income workers. Similar
policies have been applied in countries like Belgium and Italy, and to a lesser degree
in Germany.  The effect of these policies has been to twist the net earnings curve. We
show this (in an idealised way) in figure 8: We assume that at the lower end of the
skill distribution all taxes are removed. This drastically increases the net wage of20
workers, and therefore also the value of work for them. However, the price of this
policy is double. First, the degree of progressivity of the total tax burden increases
significantly. The reason is that tax rates which are now very low for low income
workers must catch up to reach the “normal “ rates for income levels that are not too
high. Second, the total tax burden for higher income workers must increase to balance
the budget.
Figure 8:













What will be the effects of this twist in the net earnings curve?. Clearly, this policy
should make low-skilled work more attractive both for the worker and the firm, and
should stimulate the employment of unskilled workers. However, the price these
countries will pay could be very high. The policy of twisting the net earnings curve
pursued in countries like France, Belgium and Italy increases the level of taxation on
higher skilled workers.  As a result, high-skilled work is made less valuable and
therefore less attractive. This shift is likely to have grave long run consequences. Most
of the job creation potential for highly developed economies is located at the higher
end of the skill distribution. As a result, continental European countries will increase
their already significant handicap in creating high-skilled jobs. The net employment
effect of the continental European solution of twisting the net earnings curve may very
well be negative.21
We conclude that the continental approach to solving the unemployment problem is
based on an illusion, i.e. that one can solve the unemployment problem while keeping
the system of income protection of workers in place. Continental European policy
makers continue to entertain the fiction, that there is a third way. This third way is one
where workers can continue to enjoy the comfort of stable and regulated income,
while the government will subsidise the outsiders into the job market. In the long run
this will force continental European government to increase their job subsidies when
with each macro-economic shock, more workers fall into the unemployment trap.
7. Conclusion.
From the analysis of this paper we distil three conclusions. First, there is a
responsibility for macro-economic management to regulate aggregate demand. This
Keynesian idea has been completely neglected in Europe (but not in the US) during
the 1990s. This neglect is partly responsible for the strong build-up of the
unemployment rate in Europe during the 1990s. In fact, one can argue that precisely
because the European supply side is so rigid the responsibility for regulating aggregate
demand is more important. One can only hope that the future EMU will make it
possible to pursue less deflationary demand management policies.
Second, there exist policies to reduce the unemployment trap which the income
protection schemes have spanned for the low-skilled workers in Europe. These
policies, however, necessarily imply reducing the degree of income protection that
workers in Europe now receive. Continental European policies now start from the
proposition that the unemployment trap of the low skilled can be eliminated without
affecting the degree of income protection of workers. We have stressed that this “third
way” can only work if the government takes over the labour market of the low-skilled
workers.
Third, if we want to eliminate the unemployment trap for the low-skilled workers
while maintaining the market system in the labour markets, a lot of convincing will
have to be done. The elimination of this unemployment trap is not only a technical
problem of identifying which rigidities matter and how to remove them. It is indeed
relatively easy to identify those rigidities that harm employment and to propose to22
abolish them. It should be realised that making the labour markets more flexible is a
euphemism for eliminating or reducing degree of protection of workers’ wages.
Phrased in those terms, it becomes clear that it is an intense political problem.
European workers, who today benefit from the many protective devices will certainly
resist and will use their strong political power to oppose change
14. The main political
challenge, therefore, is how to convince those that have a job that it is also in their
long term interest to have less protective measures. Failure to do so will inevitably put
Europe on the road towards increasing unemployment for the low-skilled workers and
an increasing call on the state to directly intervene in the employment process.
                                                
14 See the interesting work of Saint Paul(1997) on the political economy of labour market
rigidities23
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